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Abstract 
Objective: Remembering the past and imaging the future are both manifestations of 
“mental time travel” (Tulving, 1985). These processes have been found to be impaired 
in patients with bilateral hippocampal lesions. Here we examined the question of 
whether future thinking is affected by other Papez circuit lesions, namely damage to 
the mammillary bodies/fornix.   
Method: Case (SL) was a 43 year old woman who developed dense anterograde and 
retrograde amnesia suddenly, as a result of Wernicke-Korsakoff’s syndrome. A region 
of interest volumetric MRI analysis was performed. We assessed past and future 
thinking in SL and 11 control subjects of similar age and education with the adapted 
Autobiographical Interview (AI).  Participants also completed a battery of 
neuropsychological tests. 
Results: Volumetric MRI analyses revealed severely reduced fornix and mammillary 
body volumes, but intact hippocampi. SL showed substantial, albeit temporally 
graded retrograde memory deficits on the adapted AI. Strikingly, whilst SL could not 
provide any specific details of events from the past two weeks or past two years and 
had impaired recall of events from her late 30s, her descriptions of potential future 
events were normal in number of event details and plausibility.  
Conclusions: This dissociation of past and future events performance after 
mammillary body and fornix damage is at odds with the findings of the majority of 
patients with adult-onset hippocampal amnesia. It suggests that these non-
hippocampal regions of the Papez circuit are only critical for past event retrieval and 
not for the generation of possible future events.  
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Introduction 
Tulving (2002) described episodic memory as the ability to conjure personally 
experienced events of a known temporality that are rich in contextual details. 
Recently, this skill has been linked to the ability to mentally pre-experience possible 
personal future events, termed episodic future thinking (Atance & O'Neill, 2001), at 
the behavioural and neurological level (for a recent review see Addis & Schacter, 
2012)  .   
In healthy participants, studies have demonstrated similarities in the 
phenomenological detail of personal past and future event descriptions (Addis & 
Schacter, 2008; D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & 
Maguire, 2007; Levine et al., 1998; Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 
2002; Stuss, 1991). For example, as temporal distance to the present increases, the 
amount of episodic details (Addis & Schacter, 2008), and vividness (D'Argembeau & 
Van der Linden, 2004) drops in both past and future event descriptions. The 
behavioural similarities between past and future events have been further corroborated 
by findings of shared neural correlates across the two processes in functional imaging 
experiments (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar, Watson, & 
McDermott, 2007). Neuroimaging studies involving both tasks reveal activations of a 
core brain network, involving the medial and lateral temporal lobe, lateral parietal, 
medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate/retrosplenial regions (Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). 
Studies involving patients with adult onset medial temporal lesions have 
provided evidence of the hippocampus’ importance in past and future thinking. Of the 
22 patients reported in the literature with adult-onset anterograde and retrograde 
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amnesia caused by bilateral medial temporal lesions, 15  have shown significant 
problems describing both past events and possible future ones:  (MC in Andelman, 
Hoofien, Goldberg, Aizenstein & Neufeld, 2010; 4 out of 5 cases in Hassabis et al., 
2007; DB in Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002; 8 patients in Race, Keane & Verfaelli, 
2011; NN later named KC in Tulving, 1985 and Rosenbaum et al., 2005), but seven 
have not (1 out of 5 cases (PO1) in Hassabis et al., 2007; 6 cases, albeit with intact 
recall of remote events, in Squire et al., 2010). The Adapted Autobiographical 
Inventory (Addis & Schacter, 2008) was created to explore past and future thinking 
using the same technique and matching time intervals in both temporal directions.  
This has been used, for example, to examine changes in past and future thinking in 
older versus younger subjects.  
Based on this behavioural and neuroanatomical evidence, Schacter and Addis 
(2007) proposed the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis; episodic future 
thinking is achieved through the flexible recombination and integration of (past) 
episodic memory traces into novel events via relational processes. According to 
Schacter and Addis (2007), conjuring potential new experiences draws upon various 
features of encoded experiences, including outputs from perceptual systems and 
interpretation by semantic systems, in addition to the episodic memory network. 
Hence activation of a large-scale brain system, which depends heavily on the 
hippocampus for relational processes used during the recombining process (Schacter 
& Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007), seems to be crucial for both the 
ability to retrieve personally experienced past events and episodic future thinking.  
 It should be noted that the hippocampus is only the first relay station of the 
episodic memory or Papez circuit, which encompasses the hippocampus, fornix, 
mammillary bodies, thalamus and anterior cingulate (see Carlesimo, Lombardi & 
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Caltagirone, 2011 for a review). Studies in both humans and animals have found that 
damage to any of the relay structures involved in this circuit results in episodic 
memory retrieval deficits (for a review see Aggleton & Brown, 1999). Given the 
association between deficient past and future thinking found in patients with damage 
in other parts of the circuit (namely the hippocampus; Andelman et al., 2010; 
Hassabis et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2002; Race et al., 2011; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; 
Tulving, 1985), we sought to determine whether the same pattern would be observed 
when the hippocampus is intact but other Papez structures are damaged.  
Patients with Wernicke-Korsakoff’s syndrome (WKS) provide an ideal human 
lesion model to test this notion, as neuropathological studies have consistently found 
atrophy in the mammillary bodies (Sheedy, Lara, Garrick, & Harper, 1999) and 
occasionally in the anterior thalamic nuclei (Harding, Halliday, Caine, & Kril, 2000).  
Atrophy in these brain regions is associated with an amnestic presentation (Jung, 
Chanraud, & Sullivan, 2012) and/or selective deficits in contextual memory retrieval 
(Tsivilis et al., 2008; Vann, 2010; Vann et al., 2009).  Patients with WKS also show 
severe deficits in the recall of past events (i.e., autobiographical memory), with most 
patients having better recall of remote memories than recent ones (Kopelman, 1989; 
Kopelman, Stanhope, & Kingsley, 1999). Some patients with WKS confabulate 
(produce false statements) about both the past and the future (i.e., La Corte, Serra, 
Attali, Boisse & Dalla Barba, 2010), typically spontaneously (Schnider, 2008). In two 
published cases, confabulation related only to future events (Burgess & McNeil, 
1999; Schnider et al., 2013). In both cases, confabulations were recurrent, 
spontaneous and fixed: concerned an obligation to which they felt a need to respond. 
The obligation was related to a specific episode from the past, but was not relevant for 
the future. To our knowledge, no study to date has investigated whether ability to 
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construct relevant future events on demand is also impaired in WKS patients with 
selective mammillary body damage who present with anterograde and temporally 
limited retrograde amnesia. 
The current study aims to fill this gap by investigating the diencephalic 
contribution to episodic future thinking in a case with WKS amnesia (SL). 
Importantly, SL showed selective damage to the mammillary bodies and fornix, while 
the anterior thalamus and hippocampus remained relatively intact. Furthermore, we 
employed a structured, detailed approach to contrast past and future thinking: the 
adapted Autobiographical Interview (Addis & Schacter, 2008). Given the behavioural 
similarities between past and future thinking found in healthy participants and in 
patients with bilateral mesial temporal lesions we predicted that SL would show 
impaired future thinking due to her striking deficits in episodic memory. 
Method 
Approvals were granted by the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, University of Sydney 
(Protocol No X09-0338 & HREC/09/RPAH/564) and University of New South Wales 
(Biomedical, ref. #10035) Human Research Ethics Committees. All participants 
provided informed consent. 
2.1 Case Description 
SL was a 43-year-old, right-handed woman who presented in February 2009 with a 
10-day history of increasing ataxic gait, blurred vision, confusion and amnesia. She 
was diagnosed with Wernicke Korsakoff’s encephalopathy caused by nutritional 
deficiency and high alcohol consumption (2 litres of wine per day for 7 years). 
Treatment was intravenous thiamine and withdrawal of alcohol. Her initial MRI as 
well as a later one, from December 2009 confirmed diffuse cerebral and cerebellar 
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atrophy as well as hyperintensities bilaterally in the mamillary bodies and 
periaqueductal grey. In the 2009 MRI, atrophy is visible in this region (Figure 1).  A 
region of interest volumetric analysis was conducted on SL’s fornix, mammillary 
bodies, thalami and hippocampi, and compared to a control group (n= 15) of similar 
mean age (M=48.3; SD=8.4). All volumetric analyses were conducted using the VBM 
and FIRST toolboxes in FSL (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/). The regions of 
interest (ROI) boundaries were established by masking the whole brain with the 
respective regions from the Harvard-Oxford probabilistic atlas and the Juelich 
Histological atlas. There is currently no anatomical ROI for the anterior thalamus for 
T1 scans, as the borders cannot be delineated on a macroscopic level. Instead, we 
used the first third of the anterior thalamus as a proxy regional measure, which we 
have also used in previous studies (Hornberger et al. 2011; Tan et al., 2013; Tu et al. 
2015). All ROIs were corrected for total intracranial volume (TIV) to account for 
brain size differences across participants. SL had reduced mammillary body volumes 
(mm3) [SL =126; controls: mean = 235 (SD = 30.3)] and fornix volumes (mm3) [SL = 
910; controls: mean = 1201 (SD = 123.4)], but relatively intact anterior thalamus 
(mm3) [SL = 3460; controls: mean = 2955 (SD = 585.3)] and hippocampal volumes 
(mm3) [SL = 7115; controls: mean = 7579 (SD = 424.1)] (Figure 2). Statistical 
analyses of the region-of-interest (ROI) volumes, employing single case statistics 
developed by J. R. Crawford and Garthwaite (2007), revealed significant volume 
changes for the mammillary bodies (p < 0.01) and fornix (p < 0.025) but not for the 
anterior thalamus ( p > 0.1) and hippocampus (p > 0.1). 
----- Figure 1 & Figure 2----- 
From the time of her admission, SL’s clinical presentation was notable for her 
dense anterograde and retrograde amnesia. For example, during her initial illness, she 
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had no recollection of her current partner of several years, but instead thought that she 
was still living in London with her ex-husband. According to the history provided by 
a relative, this would have been her situation 16 years earlier.  In addition, she showed 
no day-to-day memory for events. On follow up conducted a year after the initial 
admission she was sober. She came to realise who her current partner was. She had 
not returned to work, but had a volunteer role in a charity shop which she attended a 
few times per week. Each time she went there as for the first time. One problem that 
arose as a result of her ongoing poor memory was a great accumulation in second 
hand clothes that she brought home because she had forgotten her previous purchases.   
SL had completed a Bachelor’s degree in Economics (15 years of education) 
and had worked in the related field for some years after graduating. She had not 
worked, however, for several years prior to admission. She had no other known pre-
existing history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. When she was tested, she 
was taking oral Thiamine and was no longer drinking alcohol. A mood inventory 
(Depression, Anxiety Stress Scales; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) indicated no 
symptoms of stress, anxiety or depression.   
Results from SL’s standard neuropsychological assessment (all carried out > 9 
months post onset) are shown in Table 1. Relative to normative data, SL demonstrated 
severely impaired anterograde memory on tests involving verbal (Verbal Paired 
Associates from the Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition, Wechsler, 1997b; Rey 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test, Lesak, 1976)   or visual (Rey Complex Figure Test; 
Rey, 1941) material: delayed recall < 5th percentile in all instances. In addition, SL’s 
generativity/verbal fluency was also severely impaired, scoring in the bottom 1st 
percentile for the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (Benton & Hamsher, 1976). 
Nevertheless, she scored within the age-appropriate range for all other measures of 
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executive functioning tested: working memory (Digit Span Backward from the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale –Third Edition; Wechsler, 1997a), mental 
flexibility (Trail Making Test - B; Partington & Leiter, 1949), response initiation and 
suppression (Hayling Test; Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and visuospatial reasoning 
(BrixtonTest; Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The test of past and future thinking (as 
described in the next section) was administered in July 2010. 
----- Table 1 ----- 
Materials 
First, a procedure used by Addis et al. (2008) was employed to investigate recall of 
past and construction of future autobiographical events. Narratives were scored using 
a scoring procedure for the Autobiographical Interview developed by Levine and 
colleagues (2002). Participants were asked to recall or imagine in as much detail as 
possible four specific events from each of the following time periods: past two years 
(excluding last month), past two weeks, next two weeks and next two years 
(excluding next month), each within a three-minute time limit, including general 
probing. Immediately after completion of each event description, participants dated 
and rated it for phenomenological detail on (i) vividness (1= vague to 6= extremely 
clear/as if it is happening now), (ii) how the event affected them emotionally (1= no 
change in how I felt to 6= tremendous emotional change) and (iii) how personally 
significant the event was to them (1=no importance at all to 6= of great importance). 
The order of Direction (past, future) was counterbalanced across control 
participants. While five participants recalled the past first, six participants recalled the 
future first. However, in both temporal directions (past or future) participants were 
asked to recall proximal (two weeks) before distal (two years) events to reduce 
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cognitive load. SL was asked to recall past events first and future events second. 
Mann Whitney U test showed that the order or recall did not affect neither the number 
of internal (past weeks, p=.33, past years, p=.66; future weeks, p=.54, future years, 
p=.23) and external (past weeks, p=.43, past years, p=.43; future weeks, p=.18, future 
years, p=.43) details generated  nor the phenomenological ratings: vividness (past 
weeks, p=1.00, past years, p=.33; future weeks, p=.93, future years, p=.54), emotional 
impact (past weeks, p=.93, past years, p=.79;  future weeks, p=.54, future years 
p=.06) and personal significance (past weeks, p=.08, past years, p=.25; future weeks, 
p=.25; future years, p=.25) 
Second, the original Autobiographical Interview (AI, Levine et al., 2002) was 
used to examine the temporal extent of SL’s autobiographical memory deficits. 
Participants were asked to recall one specific event from each of four life periods: 
Teenage Years (11-17 years), Early Adulthood (18-35), Middle Adulthood (36-one 
year prior to assessment) and Recent Time (last year). On completion of free recall of 
each event a general probe was given.  
Both interviews were audio taped, transcribed verbatim and scored using the 
AI manual. The AI separates details that are central to the episode (internal/episodic) 
from details that are episode non-specific (external/semantic). In addition, it 
distinguishes types of internal (event, time, place, perceptual, and emotion/thought) 
and external [semantic, repetitions and other (such as metacognitions or 
editorilizations)] details. Total recall scores (free recall + recall after general probe) of 
internal and external as well as different types of details were obtained for each period 
in the adapted and original Autobiographical Interviews. All transcripts of the first 
interview were scored by the main investigator (JT) who was trained in scoring. Ten 
randomly selected past and future narratives were scored by another independent, 
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trained researcher. The intraclass correlations were high for internal (ICC =.89, p 
<.01) and external (ICC =.83, p<.01) details. The transcripts of the second interview 
were first segmented into informational bits or details, classified as a unique 
occurrence, observation or thought, typically expressed as a grammatical clause. Each 
detail was then categorised as ‘‘internal’’ or‘‘external’’, representing episodic and 
semantic memory, respectively. Here, we focused on the retrieval of internal (i.e., 
episodic) details as an index of overall autobiographical event recollection. Internal 
details were those details relating directly to the main episode, located within a 
specific spatiotemporal context, and reflected episodic re-experiencing. All scoring 
was performed by a trained scorer (MH) who was trained on an independent set of 
stories with high rating consistency (ICC = .91, p  < .01). ……Michael/Sicong????... 
Finally, phenomenological qualities of events recalled in the first interview were also 
rated by two independent raters blind to the group membership (SL vs Controls) when 
a significant difference was found between SL’s and control participants’ ratings of 
events phenomenological qualities.  To further quantify the scene construction ability, 
which was not rated by study participants but is of theoretical significance, all 
transcripts of events from the first interview were also rated for contiguity (1= the 
event was a collection of separate images to 6= I could see the event unfolding in 
front of my eyes) by the same two independent raters. The mean ratings were used in 
the analyses.  
Statistical analyses 
First, SL scores were compared to scores obtained by the control group using the 
modified t-tests (J. R. Crawford & Howell, 1998) with one-tail (as SL scores were 
expected to be below the scores of the controls) and alpha at .05. We used the 
Singlims program, specifically developed to assess whether single case scores differ 
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significantly from a control sample (J.R. Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). Second, the 
differences in scores obtained in recall of past and generation of future event details 
was compared using the DiffBayes.exe program (J. R. Crawford & Garthwaite, 2007). 
This program, based on Bayesian approach, was developed to compare differences 
between scores on two tasks obtained by a single case with the differences between 
scores obtained on the same two tasks obtained by a control group. It provides: 
probability (p value) and estimate of the “percentage of the control population that 
would exhibit a more extreme discrepancy” (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2007, p 365) 
than a single case. Both programs were accessed through Professor Crawford’s web-
page:     http://homepages.abdn.ac.uk/j.crawford/pages/dept/psychom.htm.  
Results 
Past and future thinking: Adapted Autobiographical Interview 
As can be seen in Figure 3, SL recalled no specific events from the past two weeks or 
past two years.  Modified t-tests showed that her scores (RSs = 0) differed 
significantly from controls [n = 11, comparable in age M=48.27 years (SD=6.65) and 
education M=16.18 years (SD=1.99)], for both internal and external details provided 
in specific events that happened over the (i) past two weeks [t(10)=-3.69, p=0.002, Z-
CC = -3.857 and t(10)=-2.57, p=0.014, Z-CC = -2.680 respectively] and (ii) past two 
years [t(10)=-4.84, p<0.001, Z-CC = - 5.053 and t(10)=-2.93, p=0.008, Z-CC = - 
3.062, respectively].  
In contrast, SL generated specific future events. The number of internal and external 
details provided by SL and control participants did not differ [next few weeks (t(10)=-
0.37, p=.179,  Z-CC = - 0.389 and t(10)=-1.04, p=0.081, Z-CC = - 1.083 respectively), 
next few years (t(10)=-0.53, p=0.151, Z-CC = - 0.556 and t(10)=-0.98, p=0.087, Z-CC 
= - 1.027 respectively)]. Moreover, the Bayesian tests revealed that the difference 
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between past and future internal (but not external) details was significantly greater for 
SL relative to controls (p<.001; Z-DD = -4.759 and p=.368; Z-DD = -0.403). The 
likelihood that the difference between the number of past and future internal details 
for a control participant would be greater than that of SL was 0.00079.  
 
----- Figure 3 ----- 
Example transcripts of past and future proximal and distal event descriptions 
provided by SL and by one of the control participants are given below (Figure 4 a) 
and b), respectively).  As can be seen, SL’s description of a future holiday event was 
detailed, vivid and well organised, but she cannot recall any specific events from the 
past two years. There was no evidence of confabulation in the events she generated, 
all were considered plausible. 
 ----- Figure 4 ----- 
Analysis of the phenomenological details was not conducted for past events, 
as SL had not recalled any information.  As can be seen in Table 2, SL’s ratings of 
future events provided for the next two weeks and next two years were similar to 
ratings provided by control subjects in terms of (i) emotional impact and (ii) personal 
significance.  Similarly, there was no significant difference between SL and control 
subjects in their ratings of the vividness of distal future events. However, compared to 
the control group, SL rated her proximal future event descriptions (next two weeks) as 
being of significantly lower vividness.  Next, two research staff members (blinded to 
the participants’ group membership) rated the vividness and contiguity of the 
transcribed future events provided by SL and control participants. Vividness and 
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contiguity ratings of SL’s proximal and distant future events made by the research 
staff were comparable to that of control participants.   
----- Table 2 ----- 
3.2 Memory for the past: Autobiographical Interview 
As shown in Figure 5, SL provided a significantly smaller number of internal details 
from the more recent (middle age: t(17)=-3.21, p=0.003, Z-CC = -3.294 and last year: 
t(17)=-3.53, p=0.001,  Z-CC = -4.301), but not distant (teenage t(17)=0.42, p=0.340, 
Z-CC = 0.428 and early adult t(17)=0.70, p=0.247, Z-CC = 0.717) life periods relative 
to a group of control subjects of similar age and education [n=18; age M = 45.3 (SD 
=4.9); education M = 12.8 (SD = 3.4)]. SL and control subjects generated comparable 
numbers of external details across the three earlier life periods: teenage (t(17)= 0.35, 
p=0.364, Z-CC = 0.362), early adult (t(17)=-0.24, p=0.405, Z-CC = -0.250) and 
middle age (t(17)=1.40, p=0.089, Z-CC = 1.441)  Similar to the findings on the 
adapted AI, for the most recent year, SL’s recall of external details from an event was 
impaired (t(17)=-1.84, p=0.04, Z-CC = - 1.889). 
----- Figure 5 ----- 
Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that examined future thinking in a patient 
(SL) with severe WKS amnesia and volumetric confirmation of bilateral mammillary 
body damage with relatively preserved hippocampi and anterior thalamic nuclei. 
Although SL had substantial (albeit temporally limited and temporally graded) 
deficits in episodic memory in general, she was able to imagine fictitious, but 
plausible, future experiences of comparable richness and with similar 
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phenomenological qualities to those of controls. This was at odds with our prediction 
and with the findings for the majority of patients with adult-onset amnesia secondary 
to medial temporal lesions.  
Unlike all other amnesia cases with selective lesions of the Papez circuit in 
which future thinking has been investigated, SL had only limited hippocampal 
atrophy, but instead bilateral mammillary body and fornix damage. To date, the only 
other study that examined past and future thinking in patients with diencephalic 
damage involved two stroke cases with lesions of the medial-dorsal thalamus (Weiler, 
Suchan, Koch, Schwarz, & Daum, 2011). The patients in that study were free of 
anterograde memory deficits, had intact recall of events from the past and showed 
only very mild deficits in future thinking. The discrepancy between our findings and 
the results of Weiler and colleagues can be attributed to the differences in the 
diencephalic structures involved and their connectivity. Patients with lesions 
involving the medial-dorsal thalamus were specifically selected by Weiler et al. 
(2011) because of the strong connection this nucleus has to the prefrontal cortex 
(Johansen-Berg et al., 2005). The medial-dorsal thalamus does not receive any direct 
afferents from the hippocampus. Thus it is not surprising that the two patients 
examined by Weiler and colleagues showed deficits in executive skills, but only very 
mild anterograde memory deficits. By contrast, SL’s lesions in the mammillary bodies 
and fornix, which receive their main input fibres from the hippocampus (Aggleton et 
al., 2010; Vann, 2010), produced a severe amnestic syndrome, but little deficits in 
executive skills. Thus, the divergent findings of the two studies with respect to future 
thinking are likely explained by the difference in the anatomical connectivity of the 
lesioned regions and the opposite pattern of preserved and impaired cognitive skills. It 
seems likely that damage to the links between the thalamus and frontal cortices (and 
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associated deficits in executive skills) as a result of stroke in the medial-dorsal 
nucleus may have resulted in the subtle deficits in future thinking reported in the cases 
reported by Weiler et al. (2011). In contrast, relatively preserved executive skills 
could have supported SL’s ability to generate future events by utilising established 
event-scripts stored in semantic memory or from the preserved, distant events.  
The discrepancy between SL’s past recall deficits and relatively intact future 
thinking was striking. Such discrepancy is typically not found in patients with adult 
onset anterograde and retrograde amnesia, when amnesia is secondary to bilateral 
medial temporal lesions (MC in Andelman et al., 2010; 4 out of 5 cases in Hassabis et 
al., 2007; DB in Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002; 8 patients in Race, Keane & 
Verfaelli, 2011; NN later named KC in Tulving, 1985 and Rosenbaum et al., 2005). 
Although Squire et al. (2010) and Hassabis et al. (case PO1, 2007) reported a pattern 
similar to SL’s in several cases with adult onset amnesia, in these cases, the reduction 
in hippocampal volume was extreme (i.e., in excess of 3 standard deviations from the 
control mean in the case reported by Squire et al., 2010 and greater than 40% in 
Hassabis et al case PO1.  In SL, bilateral hippocampal volume was slightly (1.09 
standard deviations), but not significantly, reduced relative to controls. While this 
raises a possibility that SL experienced some hippocampal volume loss as a result of 
her illness, the severity of her memory deficits greatly exceeds memory deficits that 
are likely to arise form a possible mild reduction in hippocampal volume. Instead, her 
memory deficits are attributable to the significant volume changes evident in her 
mammillary bodies and fornix. Although an association between amnesia and 
mammillary body lesions has been known for a long time (Gudden, 1896), the 
contribution of this diencephalic structure to memory is still being discussed (Vann, 
2010) and the specific contributions that the mammillary bodies make to future 
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thinking had not been previously investigated.  Their small size makes it difficult to 
detect significant activations with fMRI.  Indeed, the mammillary bodies are often 
seen merely as a relay station between the hippocampus and the anterior thalamus, as 
they do not comprise interneurons, which usually allow excitatory or inhibitory 
modulation of neural signals (Aggleton et al., 2010; Vann, 2010). Still, the medial 
nuclei of the mammillary bodies, which are always affected in WKS (Kopelman, 
1995), receive input from multiple regions (i.e., hippocampus, tegmentum, prefrontal 
cortex). Convergence of these inputs appears to be critical for intact retrieval of 
contextual-rich information (see also Tsivilis et al., 2008). Our findings confirm that 
the mammillary bodies and fornix are critical for retrieval of contextually rich 
autobiographical memories, but they play little role in future thinking.  This contrasts 
with the role of the hippocampus, which seems to be involved in both processes 
(Andelman et al., 2010; Hassabis et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2002; Race et al., 2011; 
Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Tulving, 1985; though see Squire et al., 2010 for some cases 
of adult-onset hippocampal amnesia without deficits in future thinking).  These 
findings imply that both past and future event thinking share only a subset of brain 
regions, including the hippocampus, and although past event retrieval requires 
additional processing in diencephalic brain regions, future thinking does not.  
The dissociation of past and future thinking that we observed in our case study 
seems to contradict the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & 
Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007) and findings that the amount of 
episodic details (Addis & Schacter, 2008) drops in both past and future event 
descriptions as temporal distance from the presence increases. Indeed, according to 
this hypothesis, there should be a clear correlation between recalled details of past 
events and the generation of future events, but instead, we found a severe impairment 
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limited to the description of past events. Not only were SL’s descriptions of future 
events comparable to those of NC subjects in terms of quantity of internal and 
external details, although her scores are somewhat below the mean scores of control 
subjects, but also in most of the phenomenological ratings.  Only SL’s self-ratings of 
vividness of proximal future memories were lower than those of control subjects.  The 
transcripts of these events were rated (by an independent judge) as being of 
comparable vividness as the events described by control subjects. Thus the 
significance of SL’s lower rating of vividness of her proximal future event is unclear, 
but will be considered in our future studies. Her ratings of the emotional impact and 
personal significance of the future events generated fell within normal limits.  
Previous findings in WKS patients indicate that some very remote autobiographical 
memories remain intact (Kopelman, 1989; Kopelman et al., 1999), which is consistent 
with our findings of preserved episodic memories for teenage and early adulthood 
years in SL. It is possible that when creating future scenarios, SL utilised distant, 
preserved episodic memories to compensate for the episodic memory loss that 
covered some 15-20 years of her life, an issue we are currently investigating. This is 
further corroborated by her clinical notes which showed that her episodic present time 
was situated well and truly in the past. We propose that lesions in non-hippocampal 
regions of the Papez circuit regions do not affect the simulation of future events, 
because patients can either rely on the retrieval of very remote autobiographical 
memories and/or utilise established event-scripts stored in semantic memory as 
scaffoldings to create future events.    
  It will be critical to corroborate these findings in a bigger sample of 
patients in the future. Case studies are often viewed as controversial as it is not clear 
whether the examined patient is representative for effects on a population level. 
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Nevertheless, our findings replicate previous autobiographical memory findings in 
patients with WKS and the neuroimaging profile was very clear cut, which suggests 
that the findings in this study are genuine. Taken together, our results suggest that 
mammillary body and fornix damage specifically impaired anterograde memory and 
recall of autobiographical memories from the past several years, but not projections of 
future events. This dissociation suggests that the hippocampus may be critical for both 
processes while non-hippocampal diencephalic structures are only involved in the 
retrieval of the past. From the cognitive perspective, dissociation between past and 
future events found in our study, but also in two other studies that involved patients 
with anterograde amnesia and retrograde memory deficits (temporally extensive, PO1 
in Hassabis et al., 2007 and temporally graded, 6 cases in Squire et al., 2010) are at 
odds with the constructive episodic hypothesis, which suggests that construction of 
future events involves a single cognitive route:  recollection of past events from which 
episodic details are sourced and recombined to construct  future events via relational 
processes (i.e., relational memory). Thus we purport that an alternative cognitive and 
anatomical route enables patients with impairments in relational memory and 
autobiographical episodic memory to imagine and describe future events. In 
particular, preserved executive skills might allow one to draw on event-scripts stored 
in semantic memory to construct future events. Anatomically, a potential split of pre- 
versus post-commissural fornix projections from the hippocampus could explain the 
dissociation of the functions. More specifically, only post-commissural fornix fibers 
project to the mammillary bodies whereas pre-commissural fibres project to medial 
prefrontal cortex regions (Vann & Aggleton, 2004), which has been shown to be 
critically involved in future thinking (Stawarczyk & D'Argembeau, 2015). Hence it is 
possible that SL was able to construct future events because her hippocampus and 
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frontal lobes were still able to work together even though (because of a mammillary 
body lesion) she was unable to form new relational memories. Further experimental 
studies examining dissociations and exceptional cases in general as well as clinical 
populations are likely to provide further insight into cognitive architecture of future 
thinking, and refine theories.      
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scan showing SL’s lesions in the 
mammillary bodies compared to a healthy control. 
Figure 2. Regions of interest (hippocampus, fornix, mammillary bodies, anterior 
thalamus) volumes in SL and controls. Line indicates mean volume in controls. 
Figure 3. Mean number of internal and external event details for SL and controls for 
adapted AI divided with respect to temporal distance (weeks, years) and direction 
(past, future).  Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
Figure 4. Transcripts of proximal (a) and distal (b) past and future event descriptions 
provided by SL and a control participant on the adapted AI. 
Figure 5. Mean number of internal and external event details for SL and controls 
obtained on AI. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
  
Into the future with little past 
   
 
24 
References 
Addis, D. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). Constructive episodic simulation: Temporal 
distance and detail of past and future events modulate hippocampal 
engagement. Hippocampus, 18(2), 227-237. doi: 10.1002/hipo.20405 
Addis, D. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2012). The hippocampus and imagining the future: 
Where do we stand? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5. doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2011.00173 
Aggleton, J. P., & Brown, M. W. (1999). Episodic memory, amnesia, and the 
hippocampal-anterior thalamic axis. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
22(3), 425-489. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X99002034 
Aggleton, J. P., O'Mara, S. M., Vann, S. D., Wright, N. F., Tsanov, M., & Erichsen, J. 
T. (2010). Hippocampal-anterior thalamic pathways for memory: Uncovering 
a network of direct and indirect actions. The European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 31(12), 2292-2307. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2010.07251.x 
Andelman, F., Hoofien, D., Goldberg, I., Aizenstein, O., & Neufeld, M. Y. (2010). 
Bilateral hippocampal lesion and a selective impairment of the ability for 
mental time travel. Neurocase, 16(5), 426-435. doi: 
10.1080/13554791003623318 
Atance, C. M., & O'Neill, D. K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 5(12), 533-539. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01804-0 
Benton, A. L., & Hamsher, K. (1976). Multilingual Aphasia Examination. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa. 
Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 49-57. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 
Into the future with little past 
   
 
25 
Burgess, P. W., & McNeil, J. E. (1999). Content-specific confabulation. Cortex; a 
Journal Devoted to the Study of the Nervous System and Behavior, 35(2), 163-
182. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70792-5 
Burgess, P. W., & Shallice, T. (1997). The Hayling and Brixton Tests: Manual. 
Suffolk, England: Thames Valley Test Company Limited. 
Carlesimo, G. A., Lombardi, M. G., & Caltagirone, C. (2011). Vascular thalamic 
amnesia: A reappraisal. Neuropsychologia, 49(5), 777-789. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.01.026 
Crawford, J. R., & Garthwaite, P. H. (2002). Investigation of the single case in 
neuropsychology: Confidence limits on the abnormality of test scores and test 
score differences. Neuropsychologia, 40, 1196-1120.  
Crawford, J. R., & Garthwaite, P. H. (2007). Comparison of a single case to a control 
or normative sample in neuropsychology: Development of a bayesian 
approach. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 24(4), 343-372. doi: 
10.1080/02643290701290146 
Crawford, J. R., & Howell, D. C. (1998). Comparing an individual's test score against 
norms derived from small samples. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 12(4), 
482-486. doi: 10.1076/clin.12.4.482.7241 
D'Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2004). Phenomenal characteristics 
associated with projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the 
future: Influence of valence and temporal distance. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 13(4), 844-858. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.007 
Gudden, H. (1896). Klinische und anatommische beitrage zur kenntnis der multiplen 
alkoholneuritis nebst bemerzungen uber die regenerationsvorgange im 
peripheren nervensystem. Archiv fur Psychiatrie, 28(3), 643–741.  
Into the future with little past 
   
 
26 
Harding, A., Halliday, G., Caine, D., & Kril, J. (2000). Degeneration of anterior 
thalamic nuclei differentiates alcoholics with amnesia. Brain: A Journal of 
Neurology, 123(Pt 1), 141-154. doi: 10.1093/brain/123.1.141 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., & Maguire, E. A. (2007). Patients with 
hippocampal amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104(5), 1726-
1731. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0610561104 
Johansen-Berg, H., Behrens, T. E., Sillery, E., Ciccarelli, O., Thompson, A. J., Smith, 
S. M., & Matthews, P. M. (2005). Functional-anatomical validation and 
individual variation of diffusion tractography-based segmentation of the 
human thalamus. Cerebral Cortex, 15(1), 31-39. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhh105 
Jung, Y. C., Chanraud, S., & Sullivan, E. V. (2012). Neuroimaging of Wernicke's 
encephalopathy and Korsakoff's syndrome. Neuropsychology Review, 22(2), 
170-180. doi: 10.1007/s11065-012-9203-4 
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal experience: 
The effects of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient's ability to 
remember the past and imagine the future. Social Cognition, 20(5), 353-379. 
doi: 10.1521/soco.20.5.353.21125 
Kopelman, M. D. (1989). Remote and autobiographical memory, temporal context 
memory and frontal atrophy in Korsakoff and Alzheimer patients. 
Neuropsychologia, 27(4), 437-460. doi: 10.1016/0028-3932(89)90050-X 
Kopelman, M. D. (1995). The Korsakoff syndrome. The British Journal of 
Psychiatry: The Journal of Mental Science, 166(2), 154-173. doi: 
10.1192/bjp.166.2.154 
Into the future with little past 
   
 
27 
Kopelman, M. D., Stanhope, N., & Kingsley, D. (1999). Retrograde amnesia in 
patients with diencephalic, temporal lobe or frontal lesions. Neuropsychologia, 
37(8), 939-958. doi: 10.1016/S0028-3932(98)00143-2 
La Corte, V., Serra, M., Attali, E., Boisse, M. F., & Dalla Barba, G. (2010). 
Confabulation in Alzheimer's disease and amnesia: A qualitative account and 
a new taxonomy. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 
16(6), 967-974. doi: 10.1017/S1355617710001001 
Levine, B., Black, S. E., Cabeza, R., Sinden, M., Mcintosh, A. R., Toth, J. P., . . . 
Stuss, D. T. (1998). Episodic memory and the self in a case of isolated 
retrograde amnesia. Brain, 121(10), 1951-1973. doi: 
10.1093/brain/121.10.1951 
Levine, B., Svoboda, E., Hay, J. F., Winocur, G., & Moscovitch, M. (2002). Aging 
and autobiographical memory: Dissociating episodic from semantic retrieval. 
Psychology and Aging, 17(4), 677-689. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.17.4.677 
Lezak, M. (1976). Neuropsychological Assessment. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lovibond, P. F., & Lovibond, S. H. (1995). The structure of negative emotional 
states: Comparison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the 
Beck Depression and Anxiety Inventories. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
33(3), 335-343. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(94)00075-U 
Okuda, J., Fujii, T., Ohtake, H., Tsukiura, T., Tanji, K., Suzuki, K., . . . Yamadori, A. 
(2003). Thinking of the future and past: The roles of the frontal pole and the 
medial temporal lobes. Neuroimage, 19(4), 1369-1380. doi: 10.1016/S1053-
8119(03)00179-4 
Into the future with little past 
   
 
28 
Partington, J. E., & Leiter, R. G. (1949). Partington’s Pathway Test. The 
Psychological Service Centre Bulletin, 1, 9-20.  
Race, E., Keane, M. M., & Verfaellie, M. (2011). Medial temporal lobe damage 
causes deficits in episodic memory and episodic future thinking not 
attributable to deficits in narrative construction. The Journal of Neuroscience: 
The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 31(28), 10262-10269. 
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1145-11.2011 
Rey, A. (1941). L’examen psychologique dans les cas d’encephalopathie traumatique. 
Archives de Psychologie, 28, 215-285.  
Rosenbaum, R. S., Köhler, S., Schacter, D. L., Moscovitch, M., Westmacott, R., 
Black, S. E., . . . Tulving, E. (2005). The case of K.C.: Contributions of a 
memory-impaired person to memory theory. Neuropsychologia, 43(7), 989-
1021. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.10.007 
Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2007). The cognitive neuroscience of constructive 
memory: Remembering the past and imagining the future. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 
362(1481), 773-786. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2007.2087 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2007). Remembering the past to 
imagine the future: The prospective brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8(9), 
657-661. doi: 10.1038/nrn2213 
Schnider, A. (2008). The confabulating mind: How the brain creates reality. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press. 
Schnider, A., Nahum, L., Pignat, J. M., Leemann, B., Lovblad, K. O., Wissmeyer, M., 
& Ptak, R. (2013). Isolated prospective confabulation in wernicke-korsakoff 
Into the future with little past 
   
 
29 
syndrome: A case for reality filtering. Neurocase, 19(1), 90-104. doi: 
10.1080/13554794.2011.654221 
Sheedy, D., Lara, A., Garrick, T., & Harper, C. (1999). Size of mamillary bodies in 
health and disease: Useful measurements in neuroradiological diagnosis of 
wernicke's encephalopathy. Alcoholism, Clinical and Experimental Research, 
23(10), 1624-1628. doi: 10.1111/j.1530-0277.1999.tb04053.x 
Squire, L. R., van der Horst, A. S., McDuff, S. G., Frascino, J. C., Hopkins, R. O., & 
Mauldin, K. N. (2010). Role of the hippocampus in remembering the past and 
imagining the future. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 107(44), 19044-19048. doi: 
10.1073/pnas.1014391107 
Stawarczyk, D., & D'Argembeau, A. (2015). Neural correlates of personal goal 
processing during episodic future thinking and mind-wandering: An ALE 
meta-analysis. Human Brain Mapping, 36(8), 2928 - 2947.  
Stuss, D. T. (1991). Disturbance of self-awareness after frontal system damage. In G. 
P. Pritigano & D. L. Schacter (Eds.), Awareness of Deficit After Brain Injury 
(pp. 63-83). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Szpunar, K. K., Watson, J. M., & McDermott, K. B. (2007). Neural substrates of 
envisioning the future. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America, 104(2), 642-647. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0610082104 
Tsivilis, D., Vann, S. D., Denby, C., Roberts, N., Mayes, A. R., Montaldi, D., & 
Aggleton, J. P. (2008). A disproportionate role for the fornix and mammillary 
bodies in recall versus recognition memory. Nature Neuroscience, 11(7), 834-
842. doi: 10.1038/nn.2149 
Into the future with little past 
   
 
30 
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie 
Canadienne, 26(1), 1-12. doi: 10.1037/h0080017 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53, 1-25. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135114 
Vann, S. D. (2010). Re-evaluating the role of the mammillary bodies in memory. 
Neuropsychologia, 48(8), 2316-2327. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.10.019 
Vann, S. D., & Aggleton, J. P. (2004). The mammillary bodies: two memory systems 
in one? Nature Review Neuroscience, 5(1), 35-44.  
Vann, S. D., Tsivilis, D., Denby, C. E., Quamme, J. R., Yonelinas, A. P., Aggleton, J. 
P., . . . Mayes, A. R. (2009). Impaired recollection but spared familiarity in 
patients with extended hippocampal system damage revealed by 3 convergent 
methods. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 106(13), 5442-5447. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0812097106 
Wechsler, D. (1997a). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -Third Edition. San Antonio, 
TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Wechsler, D. (1997b). Wechsler Memory Scale -Third Edition. San Antonio, TX: The 
Psychological Corporation. 
Weiler, J., Suchan, B., Koch, B., Schwarz, M., & Daum, I. (2011). Differential 
impairment of remembering the past and imagining novel events after 
thalamic lesions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(10), 3037-3051. doi: 
10.1162/jocn.2011.21633 
 
